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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A.

ABORTION

1. Facility Licensing

N Women's Medical Center of Northwest Houston v. Bell,' Texas physicians challenged the constitutionality of the 1999 amendments to
Texas' Abortion Facility Reporting and Licensing Act 2 ("the Act")
and three regulations promulgated under the Act. The amendments con* Associate Professor, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University; of
counsel, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas. My thanks and sincere appreciation go to Lewis
Lefko and Rebecca Lambeth, Attorneys at Law, Haynes and Boone; Amanda Hopkins,
Cynthia Lowery, Kate Patrick, and Jennifer Thompson of the Class of 2002; and Cara
Lewis, Jennifer Teague, and Eileen Bamberger Youens of the Class of 2003 for their research and drafting assistance for this article.
1. 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
2. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 245.001-.022 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2002).
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cerned the Act's exemption for physicians' offices, which need not comply with the licensing requirements unless the number of abortions
performed in the office exceeds a certain threshold. Before the 1999
amendments, the threshold was that "at least 51 percent of patients
treated in a calendar year receive abortions." '3 The amendments brought
a physician's office within the scope of the Act if "the office is used for
the purpose of performing more than 300 abortions in any 12-month period."'4 The regulations imposed a variety of obligations on physicians as
abortion providers.5 The physicians moved for a preliminary injunction
to prohibit the enforcement of the statute and regulations, and the district
court granted their motion, from which the State of Texas took this interlocutory appeal.
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood
of prevailing on their argument that the amendments to the Act violated
the plaintiffs' equal protection rights6 and that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's vagueness ruling, reversed with respect to the
equal-protection argument against the amendments to the Act, and
7
remanded.
The court of appeals approved the district court's use of rational-basis
review to test the physicians' claim that the 300-abortions-per-year cutoff
for the registration of physicians' offices constituted a denial of equal protection. Despite the low standard of review, the trial court nonetheless
concluded that "it cannot be rational to conclude that a physician performing an average of one abortion a day as part of a general gynecological practice is thereby subjecting his patients to the 'high volume' risks
cited by the state." 8 The court of appeals reversed on this point, stating
that the greater power to regulate all abortion providers includes the
lesser power to regulate a smaller number of physicians based upon the
legislature's conclusion that some offices perform too few abortions to
3. Women's Med. Ctr., 248 F.3d at 414.
4. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.004(a)(2) (Vernon 2001).
5. As described by the court of appeals, the regulations, found in 25 Tex. Admin.
Code, are: (1) § 139.51(1), requiring a physician licensed as an abortion provider to "ensure that all patients ... are cared for in a manner and in an environment that enhances
each patient's dignity and respect in full recognition of her individuality;" (2) § 139.51(2),
requiring physicians to ensure that each patient will "receive care in a manner that maintains and enhances her self-esteem and self-worth;" and (3) § 139.51(43), which defines the

standard of "quality" care as "[t]he degree to which care meets or exceeds the expectations
set by the patient." Women's Med. Cr. 248 F.3d at 418. After the court of appeals' decision in this case, the Texas Department of Health deleted all three offending provisions
and all other uses of "quality" that appeared to be unconstitutionally vague. See 26 Tex.
Reg. 9094 (Nov. 9, 2001).
6. The district court declined to enjoin enforcement of the statute on due process
grounds, finding that "plaintiffs had not shown a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the

merits of their claim that the 1999 amendments impose an undue burden on a woman's
right to abortion." Id. at 416.
7. Id. at 423.
8. Women's Med. Ctr. of N.W. Houston v. Archer, 159 F. Supp. 2d 414, 465 (S.D.
Tex. 1999).
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require licensing. 9 The determination whether the line should be drawn
"at ten abortions per month or three abortions per month ... is typically
a legislative function and is presumed valid." 10
The court of appeals agreed, however, with the district court's conclusion that the challenged administrative provisions were unconstitutionally
vague. The provisions included standard language such as "enhanc[ing]
each patient's dignity and respect in full recognition of her individuality
...[and] enhanc[ing each patient's] self-esteem and self-worth,""q which
the district court observed could not be measured in any objective way
and tended to vary from patient to patient and were therefore unconstitutionally vague. 12 The court of appeals agreed: "[E]ach of these three regulations is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it impermissibly
subjects physicians to sanctions based not on their own objective behav'13
ior, but on the subjective viewpoint of others.
2. State Funding Restrictions
Texas is one of thirty states (plus the District of Columbia) that provides state funding of abortions for Medicaid recipients only when the
woman's life is endangered or the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest
but not when the abortion is otherwise "medically necessary. 1 4 The
Low-Income Women of Texas ("LIWT"), in a suit brought on their behalf
by physicians and abortion clinics, challenged this funding restriction1 5 as
a violation of the Equal Rights Amendment1 6 and the rights of privacy
9. Women's Med. Ctr., 248 F.3d at 419.
10. Id. at 420.
11. Id. at 418.
12. Women's Med. Ctr., 159 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
13. Women's Med. Ctr., 248 F.3d at 422.
14. Texas limits its Medicaid coverage to services for which the state can receive federal matching funds. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.024(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
Since the enactment of the Hyde Amendment, see Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 508(a), 509(a), 112 Stat.
2681-385 (1998), the federal government has been prohibited from paying for abortions
with Medicaid matching funds except in cases of incest or rape or when the woman's life
would be threatened unless an abortion were performed. Accordingly, Texas has implicitly
adopted the abortion-funding standards of the Hyde Amendment. See Low-Income Women of Tex. v. Bost, 38 S.W.3d 689, 692-93 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. granted). The
other 29 states (plus the District of Columbia) are listed at THE ALAN GUTrTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (February 1, 2002), http://www.
agi-usa.org/pubs/spib-SFAM.pdf (last visited March 17, 2002).
15. Plaintiffs also challenged a similar restriction in the Maternal and Infant Health
Improvement Act ("MIHIA"), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 32.001-.045
(Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2002). MIHIA provides that no funds may be used to provide
abortion services unless the mother's life is in danger. By failing to provide funding for
abortion that results from rape or incest, abortion funding under MIHIA is "even more
restricted" than under the state and federal Medicaid statutes. Low-Income Women of
Tex., 38 S.W.3d at 693. Because "the program has been unfunded and inactive since 1991,"
the court of appeals concluded that this challenge was no longer ripe for adjudication. Id.
at 695.
16. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3A (Vernon 2001) ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.").
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and equal protection of the laws 17 of the Texas Constitution. 18 Both
LIWT and the state defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the state's motion, and LIWT appealed. The court of
appeals, though declining to reach LIWT's privacy and equal-protection
arguments, 19 found that the state's failure to provide for abortion funding
for all medically necessary procedures violates the Equal Rights
20
Amendment.
The appeals court held that the Equal Rights Amendment prohibits
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, because "it is biologically impossible for a man to become pregnant;" therefore, pregnancy discrimination amounts to sex discrimination. 21 The court then examined whether
the physical characteristics of the sexes required different treatment
under the law, but it concluded that the state did not offer any explanation why the physical characteristics of pregnancy justify or require funding restrictions with respect to medically necessary abortions but not with
22
respect to any other health care services.
In the absence of any justification based upon the physical characteristics of pregnancy, a legislative classification that discriminates based upon
sex, as the court said this one does, is subject to strict scrutiny. This standard shifts the burden to the state to show that a compelling state interest
is furthered by the restriction and that the restriction is "necessary" (or is
"narrowly tailored") to promote the state's compelling interest. The state
argued that a policy favoring childbirth over abortion advances its interest in promoting fetal and maternal health. 23 The court of appeals held
that the state did not show how its interest in maternal health was furthered by denying abortions that protect maternal health and that the
state's interest in protecting fetal health is "tempered" by the mother's
rights, including her right to protect her own health first. 24 The court also
held that there are less restrictive ways to encourage childbirth, "such as
continuing to fund prenatal care and childbirth expenses and stepping-up
25
health and education efforts to prevent unwanted pregnancies.
17. Id. § 3 ("All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no
man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in
consideration of public services.").
18. The challenge was brought under the Texas constitution, because earlier challenges
to the abortion-funding restriction under the federal constitution had proved futile. LowIncome Women, 38 S.W.3d at 696-97.
19. The court of appeals noted that LIWT's privacy and equal-protection arguments
presented the court with an opportunity to decide whether the Texas constitution protects
these rights more expansively than the federal constitution but-in part because the Equal
Rights Amendment provided a basis for the court's decision-it declined to do so. Id. at
697.
20. Id. at 703.
21. Id. at 698.
22. Id. at 699-701.
23. Low-Income Women, 38 S.W.3d at 701.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 701-02. The state also argued that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would
run afoul of the state constitution's prohibitions against drawing money from state accounts or creating new appropriations other than by legislative enactment. The court of
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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

In HCA, Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Miller,26 Karla Miller was admitted to
Woman's Hospital of Texas in what was estimated to be her twentyfourth week of pregnancy with symptoms of premature labor and a lifeendangering infection. After physicians informed Karla and her husband
that their child would probably suffer from severe mental and physical
impairments if she survived delivery, the Millers requested that the medical staff perform no life-saving resuscitative measures on the baby after
her birth. Although the Millers' treatment decision was initially accepted, physicians informed the Millers after consultation that if the baby
were born alive and weighed over 500 grams, both state law and hospital
policy obligated the medical staff to administer resuscitative measures
even in the absence of parental consent. 27 Later that evening, Sidney
Miller, weighing over 600 grams, survived delivery and was resuscitated
over the objections of her parents. As predicted, she suffers from serious
28
and permanent mental and physical defects.
The Millers sued HCA and the hospital for the intentional tort of battery for treating Sidney without consent. The Millers also challenged the
hospital's policy that required resuscitation for live babies over 500 grams
and asserted negligence for the hospital's failure to have a policy that
would prevent such treatment without consent. In accordance with a
jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Millers in
the approximate amount of $60,000,000 in past and future medical ex29
penses, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest.
appeals rejected the characterization of its holding as a new appropriation and instead
wrote that its holding simply upheld a challenge to restrictions on the use of funds that had
already been appropriated by the state legislature for the Medicaid program. Id. at 702.
In dissent, Justice Yeakel argued that the funding restrictions have an impact on indigent women, not on women as a class, and that indigency is not a specially protected classification under the Equal Rights Amendment. Thus, Justice Yeakel rejected the majority's
use of strict scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of the abortion-funding restrictions in
the Medicaid statute. Id. at 706-07. He also contended that the majority opinion creates a
constitutional right to abortion funding, a contention that the majority pointedly denied,
arguing that the only right recognized by its holding is the right to be free from sex discrimination in a state program. Id. at 706.
26. 36 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. granted). The author
contributed research and analysis for the brief filed by the hospital defendants both in the
court of appeals and the supreme court. The comments in this article are mine alone and
should not be attributed in any way to the defendants.
27. Id. at 190.
28. As described by petitioners:
Sidney, now eleven years old, cannot sit up on her own. She cannot walk,
talk, or feed herself. She cannot be toilet-trained. She is legally blind. She
suffers from severe mental retardation, frequent seizures, and spastic quadri
paresis in all four limbs. As a result, Sidney will always require around-theclock care.
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 18, Miller ex rel. Miller v. HCA, Inc. (Tex.) (No. 01-0079)
(citations to the trial record omitted), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/
ebrief/01/01007901.pdf (last visited March 18, 2002).
29. HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 190-91.
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On appeal, HCA challenged the finding of liability on the basis that it
owed the Millers no duty to refrain from treating Sidney, because the
doctors and the hospital personnel were legally obligated to administer
resuscitative treatment, and the Millers themselves had no right to withhold life-sustaining treatment from their child. 30 Reversing the trial
court's judgment, the Court of Appeals for the 14th District of Texas at
Houston agreed with HCA and concluded that under Texas law, parents
have no statutory or common law right "to withhold urgently needed lifesustaining treatment from non-terminally ill children."'3 1 Their only legal
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment for a minor is if the child has been
to the procertified to have a terminal or irreversible condition pursuant
32
visions of the Texas Advance Directives Act ("the Act").
The Act provides a legal "safe harbor" from civil and criminal liability
and disciplinary action for physicians, health care professionals, and institutions that follow the statutory process for withholding or withdrawing
33
life-sustaining treatment in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
Under one such circumstance, the Act authorizes parents to execute an
advance directive on behalf of their minor child. 34 Once the minor has
been certified to be a "qualified patient"-that is, has been certified by a
physician to have a terminal or irreversible condition 3 5-ife-sustaining
treatment may be withheld or withdrawn by health care professionals
36
who then are protected from liability under the Act.
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals interpreted the Act to be
the exclusive source of parents' right to refuse consent to life-sustaining
medical treatment of their child. Under the court of appeals' interpretation of the Act, following the procedures of the Act when making treatment decisions for minors is mandatory, not voluntary, and the Act does
not simply provide for immunities under certain circumstances; it also
places substantive limits on the parties' right to make such treatment decisions at all, whether or not they are interested in securing the Act's
30. Id. at 191.

31. Id. at 194.
32. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.001-.166 (Vernon 2001). At the time
the events in this case occurred, the Natural Death Act, id. ch. 674 (Vernon 1992), was in
effect. Effective September 1, 1999, the Advance Directives Act replaced the Natural
Death Act. See Tex. S.B. 1260, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999). In most respects, except as otherwise noted, the differences between the two laws are not material to the issues raised by
this appeal.
33. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.045(d) (Vernon 2001).

34. Id. § 166.035.
35. Id. § 166.031(2) (defining "qualified patient"). Under the Natural Death Act, as
amended in 1985, there was no such separately defined term as "irreversible condition;"
the phrase was included within the definition of "terminal condition." Id. § 672.002(9)
(Vernon 1992). The Advance Directives Act defines and uses the terms as separate and
distinct concepts. See, e.g., id. § 166.002(9), (13) (Vernon 2001).
36. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.044 (Vernon 2001) (providing various

immunities when life-sustaining treatment has been withheld or withdrawn from a "qualified patient" in accordance with subchapter of the Act that deals with living wills (or, to
use the terminology of the Act, "directives to physicians")).
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legal immunities. 37
The court of appeals reasoned that to infer parents have a common law
right to withhold such medical treatment from their children would fundamentally contradict the state's interest in the preservation of human
life and the protection of minors and would present judicially intractable
legal and policy issues concerning the value of life and the quality-of-life
calculus. 38 It also noted that if parents had the right to withhold consent
to life-sustaining treatment for minors who do not have a terminal or
irreversible condition, the legislature would have created an anomalous
situation where children who have terminal or irreversible conditions are
39
accorded a greater degree of legal protection than children who do not.
The court of appeals had to contend with a provision in the Act that
expressly states that it "does not impair or supersede any legal right or
responsibility a person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment in a lawful manner. '40 The court interpreted
this section as referring only to "a competent adult's common law right to
refuse medical treatment for himself, '41 not to decisions made on behalf
of a minor. Consequently, the court held that "to the extent a child's
condition has not been certified as terminal, a health care provider is
urgentlyunder no duty to follow a parent's instruction to withhold
'42
child."
their
from
treatment
medical
needed life-sustaining
37. The logic of the court of appeals' holding ought to apply to treatment decisions
made on behalf of incompetent adults as well. In fact, the Act permits a surrogate decision
maker and the incompetent adult's physician to make "a treatment decision that may include a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the patient." Id.
§ 166.039(a), (b). With respect to minors, on the other hand, the Act merely authorizes a
surrogate to execute a "directive" (i.e., a living will)-not to make a treatment decisionon behalf of the patient. Id. § 166.035. Thus, the structure of the Act itself would support
the argument that if the treatment decisions of parents are subject to the substantive limitations of the Act (even though the Act literally addresses only "directives" for minors),
then treatment decisions on behalf incompetent adults without directives are even more
obviously limited by the requirements of the Act. This conclusion is not inconsistent with
the court of appeals' statement that "we interpret section 166.051 [which 'states that it does
not impair or supersede any legal right a person may have to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment in a lawful manner,"' HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 193-94] to refer to a competent adult's common law right to refuse medical treatment for himself." Id. at 194 n.18
(emphasis added). Unfortunately, this narrow interpretation of section 166.051 leaves
open the possibility that a treatment decision on behalf of an incompetent adult patient
pursuant to sections 166.038 or 166.039 must also satisfy the requirements of the Act, including the requirement that the patient has been certified to have a terminal or irreversible condition.
38. Id. at 194.
39. Id. This argument assumes that one of the purposes of the Advance Directives
Act is to protect minors from their parents' medical decisions by placing substantive limits
on their medical decisions, which begs the very question raised by the HCA appeal. The
court's conclusion that the parents' reading of the Act would create an "anomaly" also
assumes that children without a terminal or irreversible condition are invariably healthier
than those who have such a condition, an assumption that may be undercut by the medical
condition of Sidney Watson herself.
40. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.051 (Vernon 2001).
41. HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 194, n.18.
42. Id. at 195. Although the court of appeals recognized that ordinarily a court order
is needed to override a parent's refusal to consent to medical treatment of their child, the
court did not believe that a court order was necessary where the need for life-sustaining
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The court did not consider the possible impact of the federal "Baby
Doe" statute 43 and rule 44 on the case, explaining that absent "any indication that federal law either establishes parents' rights to consent to or
refuse medical treatment for their children or preempts state law in that
regard[, the] case is governed by state law rather than federal funding
authorities. ' 45 Indeed, one view of the Baby Doe laws supports the result
in this case, 46 and only a strained interpretation undercuts it.
In dissent, Justice Amidei rejected the majority's conclusion that the
hospital was under no obligation to obtain a court order before it could
override the Millers' treatment decision. 47 He also viewed the parents'
decision as one that is protected by the U.S. Constitution, which makes
the Advance Directives Act (and its predecessor statute, the Natural
Death Act) upon which the majority relied irrelevant. 48
The Supreme Court held oral argument in this case on April 3, 2002.

treatment is urgent and the child is in the custody of the health care provider. Id. at 193
(citing In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823-24 (Fla. 1994)).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5106i (West 1995 & Supp. 2001). These provisions were added by the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, tit. 1, §§ 121-28, 98 Stat.
1749 (1984), to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974). The law conditions payment of federal funds for state
child-protection programs upon certification by the state that it has "authority" for the
state, among other things, "to prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment
from children with life-threatening conditions." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106i(b) (West 1995 &
Supp. 2001).
44. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.1-.20 & App. (2001).
45. HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 196-97.
46. Although the Baby Doe statute and rule are facially a funding mechanism, "in
effect they create an obligation to administer treatment under certain circumstances."
ALAN MEISEL, 2 THE RIGHT TO DIE 323-24 (2d ed. 1995). As Professor Meisel observes,
"the basic duty is to provide medically indicated treatment." Id. "Withholding of medically indicated treatment" is defined as "the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and
medication) which, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment,
will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions." 42
U.S.C. § 5106g(6). This definition, and the treatment obligation that it creates, does not
apply in three situations:
when, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would(i) merely prolong dying;
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's lifethreatening conditions; or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances
would be inhumane.
Id. Nothing in the court of appeals' opinion indicates that Sidney Miller's medical condition met one of these exceptions.
47. HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 197.
48. Id. at 198.
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GOOD SAMARITAN ACT

Even though all states except West Virginia have Good Samaritan laws,
there are very few reported opinions under them. Texas' version of the
Good Samaritan law 49 is unique, however, and that unique feature was at
the center of Ramirez ex rel. Ramirez v. McIntyre,50 in which a 2-1 majority of the Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, held that the protections
afforded by the Texas Good Samaritan statute for emergency care administered in good faith are not available to a physician who could be legally
entitled to remuneration for providing that care.
On April 23, 1998, Debra Ramirez ("Ramirez") was in labor at St.
David's Medical Center in Austin. 51 Her attending physician, Dr. Patricia Gunter, had left the labor and delivery area after checking on Ramirez twice during the early stages of delivery.5 2 The delivery progressed
very rapidly after Dr. Gunter left, and an emergency page was eventually
sent out for any available doctor to assist in the delivery. 53 Dr. Douglas
McIntyre was on the labor and delivery floor when the page was sent out,
and although he had never treated or seen Ramirez before and was not
on call for Dr. Gunter, he immediately answered the page and completed
the delivery of Colby Ramirez within about 6 minutes. 54 As a result of
the complicated delivery process,55 Colby suffered permanent neurological impairment and paralysis of his right arm and shoulder. 56 Ramirez
57
sued Dr. Gunter, Dr. McIntyre, and St. David's for medical malpractice.
Raising an affirmative defense under the Good Samaritan statute, Dr.
McIntyre filed a motion for summary judgment. 58 The trial court granted
the motion, and Ramirez appealed. 59
The relevant portions of section 74.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code protects from civil liability anyone who administers
emergency care in good faith, unless the act is willfully or wantonly negligent. 60 The statute does not apply, however, to care given for or in expectation of remuneration, and if the caregiver would "ordinarily receive
or be entitled to receive" remuneration for such services, he or she will be
49. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
50. 59

S.W.3d

821 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed).

51. Id. at 823.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Ramirez had been diagnosed with gestational diabetes (a type of diabetes that
affects some women only when they are pregnant), and Colby was a macrosomic (large
body size) baby. Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 827 (Patterson, J., dissenting). When Dr. McIntyre
entered the delivery room, it appeared that Colby's shoulder had become lodged against
his mother's pelvic bone, a condition known as shoulder dystocia. Id. at 823.
56. Id.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.

59. Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 823.
60. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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deemed to be acting for or in expectation of remuneration (even if the
person chooses not to charge for the occasion in question). 6' In address61. Id. § 74.001(b), (d). No other state has a provision that takes away the Good Samaritan law's protection if the rescuer was merely entitled to receive compensation without regard to whether he or she actually received it. Forty states and the District of
Columbia simply require that the services be provided "gratuitously" or "without expectation of compensation" or some equivalent phrase, while eight states omit any mention of
compensation, remuneration, or payment for emergency services rendered. A summary of
the various provisions is set out in the following chart:
TABLE 1
State
Alabama
Alaska

Statute
ALA. CODE § 6-5-332(a) (2001)
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(b)

"Entitlement" language?
(what language is used?)
no ("gratuitously")
no ("acting as a volunteer")

(Michie 2001)
Arizona

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-

no ("gratuitously")

1471 (West 2001)
Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(a)
(Michie 2000)

no ("without compensation")

California

CAL.

Bus. & PROF.
§ 2395 (West 2001)

no (protection does not apply if
"[a] licensee who serves on an
on-call basis to a hospital emergency room": (1) received consideration for serving "on an
on-call basis" in the emergency
room; (2) "provided prior medical diagnosis or treatment to
the same patient"; or (3) "had a

CODE

contractual obligation ...

to

provide obstetrical care for the
patient or ...

had a reasonable

expectation of payment for the
emergency services provided to
the patient")
Colorado

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1321-108(1) (West 2001)

no ("without compensation"
and does not apply to "any person who renders such emergency care or emergency
assistance to a patient he is otherwise obligated to cover")

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-

no ("voluntarily and gratui-

557b(a) (West 1999 & Supp.
2002)

tously and other than in the
ordinary course of such person's
employment or practice")

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801

no ("voluntarily, without the

(2000)

expectation of monetary or
other compensation from the
person aided or treated")

District of
Columbia

D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-401 (2001)

Florida

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(a)
(West 1997 & Supp. 2002)

no ("without the expectation of
receiving or intending to seek
compensation")
no ("gratuitously")
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State
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

Iowa

Statute
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29
(2001)
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6631.5(c) (Michie 2000)
IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (Michie
2000)
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
49/25 (West Supp. 2001)
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-6-1 to
-2 (West 2001)

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 613.17

(West 1998)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 65-2891(c)

(1992)

Kentucky

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.148
(Banks-Baldwin 1998)

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 37:1731

1123

"Entitlement" language?
(what language is used?)
no ("without making any charge
therefor")
no ("without remuneration or
expectation of remuneration")
no ("no mention of compensation/volunteering at all")
no ("provides emergency care
without fee to a person")
no ("does not apply to a person
... who receives payment, or is
an employee of a person who
receives payment, for services
rendered in connection with the
emergency, from a person
whose act or omission caused in
whole or in part the emergency")
no ("without compensation"; "if
a volunteer fire fighter, a volunteer operator or attendant of an
ambulance or rescue squad service, a volunteer paramedic...
receives nominal compensation
not based upon the value of the
services performed, that person
shall be considered to be receiving no compensation")
no (even protects physicians
who are compensated for providing emergency care "until
such time as the physician
employed by the patient or by
the patient's family or by guardian assumes responsibility for
such patient's professional
care")
no (does not apply to services
performed "for remuneration or
with the expectation of remuneration")
no ("gratuitously")

(West 2000)
Maine

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,

§ 164 (West 1980)
Maryland

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-603 (2001)

Massachusetts

MASS.
(1996)

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

GEN. LAWS

ch 112, § 12B

§ 691.1501(1) (West 2000)

no ("voluntarily [and] without
the expectation of monetary or
other compensation")
no ("without fee or other compensation")
no ("as a volunteer and without
fee")
no ("where physician-patient
relationship ... did not exist
before the advent of the emergency")
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Statute

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2001)

Mississippi

MIsS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37
(1999)

Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.930
(West 2001)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714
(2001.)
NEi3. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 186
(2001)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 41.500,
41.505 (Michie 2001)

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

New Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:12
(2001)

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1
(West 2000)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-3
(Michie 2001)

New York

N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6527(2)
(McKinney 2001)

[Vol. 55
"Entitlement" language?
(what language is used?)

no (without "compensation or
the expectation of compensation
... This subdivision does not
apply to a person rendering
emergency care, advice, or assistance during the course of regular employment, and receiving
compensation or expecting to
receive compensation or for
rendering the care, advice, or
assistance")
no (suggests that even compensated emergency care will be
protected from liability)
no ("without compensation")
no ("without compensation")
no ("gratuitously")
no ("'gratuitously' means that
the person receiving care or
assistance is not required or
expected to pay any compensation or other remuneration for
receiving the care or assistance"; also there must be no
"preexisting relationship as a
patient")
no ("no direct compensation for
the care from or on behalf of
the person cared for")
does not mention compensation/
volunteering, although case law
has clarified that the protection
of this statute does not cover
those with a preexisting duty to
act. See Velazquez v. Jiminez,
763 A.2d 753 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000)
no (does not cover care "rendered for remuneration or with
the expectation of remuneration
or is rendered by a person or
agent of a principal who was at
the scene of the accident or
emergency because he or his
principal was soliciting business
or performing or seeking to
perform some services for
remuneration")
no ("voluntarily and without the
expectation of monetary compensation")

HEALTH CARE LAW

2002]

1125

ing the issues raised on appeal, the court of appeals first stated that there
was no question that Dr. McIntyre acted in good faith and did not act
State
North Carolina

Statute
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.14,
90-21.16 (2001)

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-04
(2001)

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2305.23 (West 2002)

Oklahoma

tit. 76, § 5

no (just "[w]here no prior contractual relationship exists," and
"voluntarily and without compensation")

§ 30.800 (1999)

no ("given voluntarily and without the expectation of compensation")
does not mention compensation/
volunteering at all
no ("voluntarily and gratuitously")
no ("gratuitously")

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

(West 2001)

Oregon

OR.

Pennsylvania

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8331 (West 2001)
R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-27.1
(2000)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310
(Law. Co-op. 2001)

Rhode Island
South Carolina

REV. STAT.

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED
(Michie 2001)

Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN.

LAWS

§ 20-9-3

§ 63-6-218

(2001)
Utah

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 58-13-2,

78-11-22 (2001)

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN.

tit 12, § 519

(2000)
Virginia

VA. CODE ANN.

(Michie 2001)

"Entitlement" language?
(what language is used?)
no ("receives no compensation"; volunteers are also covered)
no (allows physicians who
render emergency care to try to
recover a fee from the person
injured or that person's estate,
but then states that "[any person rendering aid or assistance
with an expectation of remuneration shall not be covered by
the provisions of this chapter")
no (does not cover aid "rendered for remuneration, or with
the expectation of remuneration")

§ 8.01-225

does not mention compensation/
volunteering at all
no ("without making any direct
charge therefor")
no (general statute: "gratuitously"; statute for health care
providers: "under no legal duty
to respond")
no ("unless [the person] will
receive or expects to receive
remuneration")
no ("without compensation"
and, for obstetrical emergencies,
only protects physicians who
administer emergency care to
someone "who has not previously been cared for in connec-.
tion with the pregnancy by such
person or by another professionally associated with such
person and whose medical
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willfully or wantonly. 62 Instead, Ramirez contended that summary judgment was improper, because Dr. McIntyre (1) acted for or in expectation

of remuneration, or (2) should have been deemed to act for or in expecta63

tion of remuneration.
In support of his summary judgment motion, Dr. McIntyre proffered
his own affidavit stating that (1) he did not charge Ramirez for his services, (2) he did not expect to be compensated when performing the services, and (3) he would never charge in that type of situation. 64 The
record on appeal also included the deposition testimony of Dr. McIntyre. 65 The court found that both the affidavit and the deposition testimony established that Dr. McIntyre did not receive or expect to receive

State
Virginia (cont'd)

Washington

Statute

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 4.24.300 (West 1988)

West Virginia

None

Wisconsin

WiS. STAT. ANN § 895.48 (West
Supp. 2002)

"Entitlement" language?
(what language is used?)
records are not reasonably
available to such person shall
not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions
resulting from the rendering of
such emergency care or assistance")
no ("without compensation or
the expectation of compensation"; but "[a]ny person rendering emergency care during the
course of regular employment
and receiving compensation or
expecting to receive compensation for rendering such care is
excluded from the protection of
this subsection")
West Virginia does not have a
statute protecting from civil liability physicians who render
emergency aid

Wyoming
62.
63.
64.
65.

Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-120
(Michie 2001)
Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 824.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.

no ("immunity does not extend
when employees trained in
health care or health care professionals render emergency
care for compensation and
within the scope of their usual
and customary employment or
practice at a hospital or other
institution equipped with hospital facilities, at the scene of any
emergency or accident, enroute
to a hospital or other institution
equipped with hospital facilities
or at a physician's office")
no ("without compensation")
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remuneration from Ramirez. 66
However, the court went on to hold that Dr. McIntyre had the additional burden of establishing that he was also not entitled to remuneration for the services he provided to Ramirez. 67 The court reasoned that,
if Dr. McIntyre was entitled to remuneration, he must then be deemed to
have acted for or in expectation of remuneration. 68 The only evidence in
the record addressing this issue was the doctor's deposition testimony
that he did not think he was ethically allowed to bill Ramirez. 69 The
court found this testimony was inconclusive on the issue of whether Dr.
McIntyre was entitled to remuneration and held that Dr. McIntyre had
failed to carry his summary judgment burden on this issue. 70 Since Dr.
McIntyre did not conclusively prove that he was not entitled to remuneration, the court held that he had failed to establish his affirmative defense
under the Good Samaritan statute as a matter of law. 71 The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court. 72
In dissent Justice Patterson argued that Dr. McIntyre had met his burden and was therefore entitled to summary judgment, unless Ramirez
raised a fact issue. 73 Ramirez did offer evidence from Dr. McIntyre's
deposition testimony that Dr. McIntyre could have found Ramirez's address and sent her a bill.7 4 But the dissent found that since there was no
evidence that Dr. McIntyre contemplated doing so, and since there was
no evidence that he had done so before, Ramirez failed to raise a fact
issue through the deposition testimony as to whether Dr. McIntyre performed the services for or in expectation of remuneration. 75 The dissent
placed Dr. McIntyre's declaration (which the majority found inconclusive) that he did not believe he could have received remuneration for his
services in the context of his affidavit and preceding testimony that
neither he nor anyone he knew charged for such services. 76 The dissent
found that the statement was uncontroverted except for the affidavit of a
Maryland doctor that the trial court ruled was inadmissible and that Ra77
mirez had failed to raise a fact issue on that point.
The dissent went on to disagree with the majority's interpretation of
the Texas Good Samaritan statute. According to the dissent, the majority's holding that the statute does not protect physicians who could be
legally entitled to receive remuneration for emergency care runs contrary
to the intent of the legislature and the plain meaning of the statute it66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 826.
Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 826.
Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 826.
Id. at 826-27.
Id. at 827.
Id.
Id. at 828.
Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 829.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 830.
77. Id. at 829.

ANN.

§ 74.001(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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self.78 The dissent argued that if entitlement to remuneration were part
of the test for protection under the Good Samaritan statute, no doctor
would be willing to render emergency care. 79 Since Dr. McIntyre's testimony on the issue of whether he received or expected to receive remuneration was uncontroverted, the dissent would have affirmed the trial
court's judgment. 80

B.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

In Weyandt v. Texas,81 Linda Weyandt was convicted of practicing
medicine without a license. She worked as a nurse anesthetist at the Veterans' Hospital in Houston and ran an independent clinic, Associated
Hypnotherapy and Pain Management Services of Texas ("Clinic"). 82 The
Clinic's yellow-pages advertisement and the signs outside the Clinic all
identified the appellant as "Dr. Linda J. Weyandt. ' '83 Ms. Weyandt graduated from a medical school in Mexico, but she was not licensed to practice medicine in Texas, although she was a Certified Registered Nurse
Anesthetist ("CRNA"), an advanced nurse practitioner, and a certified
84
hypnotherapist.
An undercover police officer visited Weyandt's clinic, and she failed to
clarify that she was not licensed to practice medicine. 85 She examined the
police officer's arm, passed electrical current through it, attempted to
perform hypnosis on the officer, and charged the officer seventy-five dolofficers
lars for the visit. 86 Upon later searching the premises, police
87
found a cabinet full of prescription drugs, including lidocaine.
After her jury conviction for practicing medicine without a license,
Weyandt appealed on five grounds for reversal: (1) legal insufficiency of
the evidence, (2) factual insufficiency of the evidence, (3) the trial court's
decision to admit evidence of extraneous crimes, (4) the unconstitutional
vagueness of the Medical Practice Act's prohibition against the unauthorized practice of medicine, as applied to Weyandt, and (5) the violation of
her constitutional right to remain silent when the prosecutor inadvertently used appellant's name when he called a witness to the stand. 88
The court discussed each of the points of error and ultimately affirmed
78. Id. at 830-31.
79. Ramirez, 59 S.W.3d at 831.
80. Id.
81. 35 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
82. Id. at 148.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. For example, Ms. Weyandt introduced herself as "Dr. Weyandt," displayed
certificates on her wall with "M.D." after her name, described herself as being "in anesthesia" for almost 20 years, and she criticized the previous work of an anesthesiologist by
saying "she would not have done it that way" without clarifying that she was not an anesthesiologist. Weyandt, 35 S.W.3d at 148.
86. Id. at 148-49.
87. Id. at 149.
88. Id. at 148.
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the decision of the trial court. 89 Of special interest, however, was the
vagueness challenge to the Medical Practice Act as it applied to Weyandt.
In order to be unconstitutionally vague, a statute either must fail to provide a reasonable person sufficient information to understand exactly
what conduct is prohibited or it must provide insufficient notice of the
prohibited conduct to law enforcement personnel. 90
The relevant language of the Medical Practice Act provided:
It shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, trust, association,
or corporation by the use of any letters, words, or terms as an affix
on stationery or on advertisements, or in any other manner, to indicate that the individual partnership, trust, association, or corporation
is entitled to practice medicine if the individual or entity is not licensed to do so.9 '
Weyandt argued that the words "in any other manner" did not provide
an objective standard by which to measure her conduct and that no adequate notice was given to Weyandt and law enforcement officials of what
was prohibited. 92 The court held that the statute is not unconstitutionally
vague, because it prohibits the use of the initials "M.D." and "Dr." in
ways that might suggest that an unlicensed individual or entity is entitled
to practice medicine, which is exactly what appellant did in this case. 93
Although Ms. Weyandt's evidence showed that she performed duties that
were atypical of a physician, such as answering the phones, 94 by calling
herself "Doctor," she created the impression that she was a licensed physician and thus held herself out to be licensed to practice medicine. 95
C.

ESTABLISHMENT OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

In St. John v. Pope,96 the Texas Supreme Court held in 1995 that a
telephone conference between a hospital's on-call board-certified internist and the emergency-room physician did not establish a physician-patient relationship between the on-call physician and the emergency-room
patient. The key to the supreme court's holding was its conclusion that
the on-call physician's telephonic consultation was for the purpose of determining "whether he should take the case [or refer the patient to a hospital with appropriate facilities and expertise], not as a diagnosis for a
course of treatment. '97 A recent Dallas Court of Appeals case considered the question but concluded that on the slightly different facts before
89. Id. at 157.
90. Weyandt, 35 S.W.3d at 155.
91. Id. After the date of the offense, the Legislature codified this provision of the
Medical Practice Act without substantive change as TEX. Occ. CODE § 165.156 (Vernon
Supp. 2002). See Act of Sept. 1, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 388, § 1.
92. Weyandt, 35 S.W.3d at 155.
93. Id. at 156.
94. Id. at 153.
95. Id.
96. 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1995).
97. Id. at 424.
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it, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in the physician's favor.
In Lection v. Dyll,98 Sandra Lection came to the hospital's emergency
room with a variety of neurological symptoms, including severe headache, slurred speech, partial paralysis, and dizziness. After examining the
patient and reviewing her EKG and CT-scan results, the emergency-room
physician consulted the on-call neurologist, Louis Dyll, by telephone. After describing the examination and test results, the emergency-room physician asked whether anything further needed to be done. Dr. Dyll
"responded that 'no further treatment needed to be done for this patient
at the time,' that 'it sounded like [the patient] had a hemiplegic migraine'
and that 'nothing further needed to be done,' which included admission
into the hospital." 99 At some point Lection left the hospital with her husband; it is unclear whether that occurred before or after the telephone
consultation occurred between the emergency-room physician and Dr.
Dyll. Lection suffered a stroke the next day and sued Dr. Dyll for negligence in making an incorrect diagnosis, providing the emergency-room
physician with inappropriate instructions, and failing to order Lection admitted into the hospital for further observation and possible treatment. 100
Dr. Dyll moved for summary judgment on the ground that no physicianpatient relationship existed between the plaintiff and him, and the trial
court granted his motion.1 01
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial.' 0 2 The principal
basis for the court's ruling, and the key fact that the court said distinguishes this case from St. John, was the nature of the telephone conversation between Dr. Dyll and the emergency-room physician. That
conversation, held the court, was not for the sole purpose (as in St. John)
of determining whether the patient could be safely treated in the hospital
or should be transferred to a more sophisticated facility. Instead, "Dyll
diagnosed Lection's ailment, determined the necessary course of treatment (none immediately), and, instead of acknowledging a lack of competence to treat the patient, as Dr. St. John acknowledged, Dyll directed
[the emergency-room physician] to send Lection to see him the following
Monday for treatment."'10 3 Combined with summary judgment evidence
that the hospital's by-laws obligated on-call physicians to assist emergency room physicians and to treat all emergency room patients, 10 4 which
the court said was not a factor in St. John, Lection was entitled to a trial
on her medical malpractice claim against the neurologist.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

65 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 715.
Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 709.
Id.
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HOSPITALS

LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

10 5
In the 1998 case of Baptist Memorial Hospital System v. Sampson,
the Texas Supreme Court held that a hospital may be vicariously liable
for the negligence of an independent-contractor physician under the theory of ostensible agency. The elements of ostensible agency, as the court
set them out in Sampson, are: (1) the patient had a reasonable belief that
the physician was the agent or employee of the hospital; (2) the patient's
belief was based upon the hospital's holding out the physician as its agent
or employee (or failed to act when the physician held herself out as the
hospital's agent or employee); and (3) the patient justifiably relied on the

holding out. 106 In the few years since Sampson was decided, the courts of

appeals have struggled to apply its lessons in a succession of cases involving emergency department and other hospital-based physicians. A handful of cases from this Survey year will illustrate some of the points of
contention.
In Garrettv. McCuistion Community Hospital,1 0 7 Dorothy Garrett sued
McCuistion Community Hospital ("MCH"), three physicians, and their
professional associations for medical malpractice. Specifically, Garrett alleged that Dr. Dennis Schmidt ("Schmidt"), a radiologist, misdiagnosed a
spinal mass as a cancerous lesion instead of a spinal abscess. 10 8 Even
though Schmidt was an independent contractor and not an employee of
MCH,10 9 Garrett claimed that MCH was vicariously liable for the negligence of Schmidt on the basis of ostensible agency. 1 0
MCH asserted that there was no evidence to support the second element of ostensible agency, i.e., that it affirmatively held out Schmidt as its
agent or employee, or that it knowingly allowed Schmidt to hold himself
The
trial court agreed and granted sumout as its agent or employee.'' 11
2
mary judgment in MCH's favor.
Garrett's summary judgment evidence showed that (1) she knew MCH
had a radiology department; (2) she received a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan at MCH; (3) she knew that MRIs were read on site at
MCH; (4) she believed a radiologist working for MCH would read her
105. 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998).
106. Id. at 949.
107. 30 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
108. Id. at 654.
109. Id. Schmidt is a partner in Radiology Consultants, P.A., a group of radiologists
that contracted with the Hospital to provide radiologists for the Hospital's radiology department. Id.
110. Id.
111. Garrett,30 S.W.3d at 656.
112. Id. at 654. After MCH moved for summary judgment, Garrett amended her petition, adding additional causes of action against MCH. After the trial court granted partial
summary judgment for the three physicians, their associations, and the hospital on the
original cause of action of medical malpractice, Garrett settled her claim with Schmidt and
nonsuited the other physicians and their associations. She also nonsuited the Hospital with
respect to all but the original claim of medical malpractice. Id.
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MRI; (5) she did not choose the radiologist; (6) no one at MCH told her
that the radiologist was an independent contractor; (7) the radiology department did not have signs that said the doctors were independent contractors; and (8) she could not recall seeing any forms that said the
113
radiologists were independent contractors.
In addressing Garrett's claims, the court of appeals stressed that the
second element could only be met if MCH engaged in affirmative conduct and noted that to hold otherwise would effectively create a presumption of ostensible agency any time a hospital chose to offer radiology or
other services within the hospital. 114 Since Schmidt was not alleged to
have interacted with Garrett directly, the court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment, concluding that Schmidt's action's, omissions, or
mere presence as an authoritative medical specialist did not fulfill the
1 15
second element of ostensible agency.
Justice Grant wrote a vigorous dissent. He argued that the doctrine of
ostensible agency should be used to estop MCH from disclaiming responsibility for the doctor's acts.1 16 Grant pointed out that two factors present
in Sampson were missing from Garrett's case: (1) the hospital in Sampson
had posted signs informing patients that the treating physicians were not
agents or employees of the hospital, and (2) patients were required to
sign consent forms indicating that they understood that the physicians
were not hospital agents or employees. 1 7 According to Justice Grant, a
proper application of Sampson to the instant case would mean that the
hospital's actions of housing the radiologist and selecting the radiologist
for the patient would need to be countered by signs and consent forms
separating the radiologists' conduct from that of the hospital; without
these or similar acts to inform the patients, however, MCH's provision of
facilities for the radiologists and selection of radiologists to treat certain
patients constituted a holding out sufficient to establish a finding of ostensible agency because they were not countered by signs, consent forms,
or similar acts.' 18
It is often remarked that Sampson makes it nearly impossible for a
plaintiff to succeed on an ostensible agency claim against a hospital (at
least when the hospital posts a few signs and inserts disclaimers into the
admissions forms). The impact of Sampson does indeed seem large, judging from a case like Garrett, in which the hospital prevailed apparently
without lifting its corporate finger to negate the patient's impression that
she was dealing with a physician who was an employee or agent of the
hospital. Yet two unpublished opinions from the El Paso Court of Appeals offer unciteable evidence that it is still possible for a plaintiff to
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 656.
Id. at 656-57.
Garrett,30 S.W.3d at 657.
Id. at 658 (Grant, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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survive summary judgment on such a claim. 119
B.

PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE

In In re The University of Texas Health Center at Tyler,120 the Texas
Supreme Court held that the University of Texas Health Center at Tyler
("Health Center") did not waive its statutory peer review privilege creAct 12 1 and section
ated under former section 5.06 of the Medical Practice
122
Code.
Safety
161.032 of the Texas Health and
James McClain ("McClain") and members of his family sued the
Health Center after he and several other patients contracted infections
119. In Moreno v. Columbia Med. Ctr.-East, No. 08-00-00040-CV, 2001 WL 522432
(Tex. App.-El Paso May 17, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), plaintiff
sought treatment for abdominal pain in the hospital's emergency room. He alleged that
the independent-contractor physician negligently failed to diagnose his perforated appendix and that the hospital should be vicariously liable for the physician's negligence under
an ostensible agency theory. There was evidence that the hospital posted a sign in the
emergency-room lobby that stated that "billing for the ER physicians was handled separately by a different entity from Columbia" and that the plaintiff in fact received a separate
bill for the physician's services. Id. at *3. But there was also evidence that the plaintiff was
in too much distress upon his arrival at the hospital to notice the lobby signs and that he
did not attach any particular legal significance to his receipt of a separate bill for the ER
physician's services. Id. at *4. So far, as the court of appeals conceded, id., this case
sounds a lot like Sampson. But in Sampson there was no evidence of an affirmative holding out by the hospital, while in Moreno the plaintiff and his mother both testified that the
physician wore a lab coat with the hospital's insignia on it. Id. The physician testified that
he had never worn, and Columbia had never provided, a lab coat with the hospital's insignia on it, and this factual dispute, held the court, was enough to defeat defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Moreno, 2001 WL 522432, at *4.
In Barragan v. Providence Mem'l Hosp., No. 08-99-00028-CV, 2000 WL 1731286 (Tex.
App.-El Paso November 22, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), the Barragans sued in their individual capacity and as next-friend of their minor son, alleging negligence in the delayed diagnosis, treatment, and surgery of their son's tortion and atrophy
of a testicle. Id. at *1. The ER physician was an independent contractor; thus, the plaintiffs' prospects for summary-judgment success on their claim against the hospital once
again turned on their ability to create a triable issue of fact on the Sampson element of
holding out. The El Paso court made it clear in this opinion that it is no fan of Sampson. It
came close to supporting the most un-Sampson-like idea that changes in the way hospitals
and physicians are viewed by patients ought to put the burden on physicians to negate
ostensible agency rather than on patients to establish it. See id. at *2-3. Despite the Sampson precedent, the court finds numerous factual differences between the instant case and
Sampson sufficient to defeat the hospital's motion for summary judgment as a matter of
law. These differences included: (1) the absence of independent-contractor signage in the
ER waiting area or examination rooms; (2) the fact that the hospital billed for ER physicians' services; (3) a consent form that perfunctorily disclaimed the existence of an employment or agency relationship with the ER physician, as opposed to the more emphatic and
allegedly clearer disclaimer in the Sampson consent form; (4) the likelihood that the hospital's disclaimers were not particularly noticed or understood by parents who were traumatized by their son's pain and vomiting, concerned about the delay in diagnosis and
treatment, and not particularly adept speakers or readers of English; and the fact that the
ER nurse (an employee of the hospital) described the hospital's ER physicians to the
plaintiffs as "our" doctors. Id. at *6-7.
120. 33 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. 2000).
121. The Medical Practice Act was repealed and codified in the Texas Occupations
Code in 1999. See supra note 91. Former § 5.06 is now TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 160.002
(Vernon Supp. 2002).
122. TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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following open-heart surgery at the Health Center. 12 3 During discovery,
McClain requested production of several categories of documents, including documents that the Health Center contended were privileged because
they were prepared by one of its peer review committees. 124 McClain
asserted that the Health Center had waived its statutory peer review privilege, and the trial court agreed with McClain. 2 5 After the court of apof
peals refused (without opinion) the Health Center's petition for writ 126
mandamus, the Health Center petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas.
In a per curiam opinion, the court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus because there was no waiver of the exemption from discovery afforded by state law, and the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
127
production of all documents.
The court's decision to grant mandamus was based on its interpretation
of the Medical Practice Act, which provides that healthcare entities may
form peer review committees to review or evaluate the competence of the
physician and the quality of medical and health care services.1 28 Furthermore, all proceedings and medical peer review committee records are
confidential, and all records of, determinations of, and communications
to a committee are privileged and are not discoverable, with certain exceptions.' 2 9 Similarly, the Health and Safety Code states that "the
records and proceedings of a medical committee are confidential and are
not subject to court subpoena."'' 30 The court held that the requested documents were covered by the Medical Practice Act and were therefore not
13 1
discoverable.
McClain claimed that the Health Center waived the privilege when it
(1) failed to object to the second of three virtually identical deposition
notices; (2) did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193 when
making its objections; and (3) provided information about the peer review committee's evaluation in answers to interrogatories served by another patient in a suit that was consolidated with McClain's suit for
discovery. 32 The supreme court rejected all of the three waiver theories.
123. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 824.
124. Id. According to the Health Center, this particular committee (the Infection Control Committee) prepared the documents in question as part of an evaluation of the medical care provided to McClain and the other infected open-heart surgery patients. Id.
125. Id. The trial court first conducted an evidentiary hearing, and the Health Center
submitted the documents for in camera inspection. Without notice to the Health Center,
the trial court gave the documents to McClain a few days after the hearing. The Health
Center objected after learning about this; the court ordered the documents returned, held
a second hearing, and eventually entered an order requiring the Health Center to produce
the documents to McClain. Id.
126. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 824.
127. Id. at 827-28.
128. Id. at 824-25. The current version of former § 1.03(a) of the Medical Practice Act
is TEX. OCC.CODE ANN. § 151.002(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
129. Id. at 825. The current version of former § 5.06(g), (j), (s)(3) is TEX. OCC. CODE
ANN. §§ 160.007(a), (b), (e)-(g), 160.006(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
130. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
131. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Or., 33 S.W.3d at 825.
132. Id. at 825-26.
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In addressing the first theory, the court observed that McClain served
the Health Center with three deposition notices that were identical except for the date and time of the deposition and that the Health Center
133
asserted the privilege in its responses to the first and third notices.
Since the Health Center made its objection clear in the first response to
the notice and request for documents, the court held that it was not necessary for the Health Center to reiterate its objection in its response to
the second notice.134 The supreme court also quickly dismissed McClain's second theory, since Rule 193 became effective on January 1,
1999, which was after McClain served the Health Center with its final
135
notice and after the Health Center had already filed its objections.
Finally, the court held that the Health Center's "voluntary production
of information about the Infection Control Committee's recommendations in response to" another plaintiff's interrogatory also did not constitute waiver of the peer review privilege. 136 The court pointed out that the
former Medical Practice Act provided specific means for waiving the peer
review privilege 137 and that the party seeking the information has the
burden of proving waiver. 138 Since the Health Center did not waive the
privilege in accordance with the statute, the court held that McClain was
139
not entitled to the documents in question.
The court went on to state that the trial court did not waive the Health
Center's privilege when it released the contested documents to McClain,
since the privilege belongs to the Health Center and can only be waived
voluntarily.' 40 Furthermore, the court stated that the Health Center does
not have an adequate remedy by appeal and that mandamus is appropriate to address a court order requiring production of privileged documents. 14 ' The court then granted the Health Center's petition and
conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order mandating the Health Center to release the documents at
42
issue.'
133. Id. at 826.
134. Id.
135. Id. The new rule provides that a "party should not object to a request for written
discovery on the grounds that it calls for production of material or information that is
privileged but should instead comply with Rule 193.3. A party who objects to production
of privileged material or information does not waive the privilege but must comply with
Rule 193.3 when the error is pointed out." TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.2(f).
136. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 827.
137. Id. (a committee must execute the waiver, and the waiver must be in writing).
Former § 5.060) of the Medical Practice Act is now TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 160.007(e)(g) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
138. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 827; see Act of June 1, 1987, supra note
129.
139. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 827.
140. Id.; see also Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.
1992).
141. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 827; see also Brownwood Reg'l Hosp.
v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 927 S.W.2d 24, 27-28 (Tex. 1996).
142. In re Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 827.
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In Poliner v. Texas Health Systems, 143 a hospital peer review committee
suspended Dr. Poliner from performing cardiac procedures for a period
of time. Dr. Poliner filed a motion to compel to obtain information
through the deposition of Dr. James Knochel regarding the manner in
which the peer review committee made its decision. This information
would enable Mr. Poliner to show that the committee's decision to suspend him was not objectively reasonable or that it was malicious. Dr.
Knochel asserted that the requested information was privileged on the
basis of the confidentiality afforded to peer review materials under the
Health-Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986144 ("HCQIA") and provi145
sions of the Medical Practice Act.
The District Court distinguished Poliner from recent Texas Supreme
Court cases which have held that peer review materials are privileged and
not subject to discovery. 146 Upon review of the HCQIA, the district
court concluded that this statute did not create an inviolable bar to discovery of materials relating to peer review committees. The court recognized that such a privilege would exclude a wrongfully disciplined
physician from showing that a peer review committee acted with malice
by precluding them from proving that the data upon which the committee
acted did not support the sanction imposed. In accordance with Congress' view that confidentiality serves an important public interest, 147 the
court determined that although Mr. Poliner was not barred by any federally recognized privilege from discovery of peer review materials, some
restrictions on such discovery were appropriate to protect the interests of
peer reviewers and patients.
IV.

LIABILITY: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In 1993 the Legislature enacted chapter 321 of the Health and Safety
Code. Section 321.002 requires the Texas Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation ("TDMHMR") and other state health care regulatory agencies to adopt a "patient's bill of rights" for any patient who
receives voluntary or involuntary in-patient "mental health, chemical dependency, or comprehensive medical rehabilitation services."'1 48 Section
321.003 authorizes a person who has been harmed by a violation of the
"patient's bill of rights "to sue for injunctive relief or damages."' 149 That
section also provides that "[a] treatment facility or mental health facility
that violates a provision of ... a ['patient's bill of rights'] is liable to a
person receiving care or treatment in or from the facility who is harmed
143. 201 F.R.D. 437 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11101 (West 1995).
145. TEX. Occ. CODE § 160.007(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
146. See Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 927 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996); Mem'l Hosp. The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
147. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11101 (West 1995).
148. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 321.002(a) (Vernon 2001).
149. Id. § 321.003(b).
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as a result of the violation."' 150 The question that at least three courts of
appeal have wrestled with during this Survey year is whether section
321.002 constitutes a clear and unambiguous legislative waiver of immunity from suit such that state institutions may be sued pursuant to section
321.002. The first court to decide this issue concluded that the legislature
had not waived its sovereign immunity. The next two courts, however,
agreed that the legislature had, in fact, done so. The Texas Supreme
Court has granted review in the third of these cases, so we may get a
resolution of this conflict among the appellate courts in the coming year.
In the first case, Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Lee,151 Robin Lee was sexually assaulted by an HIV-positive
patient while she was under the care of Wichita Falls State Hospital. She
filed suit against the hospital and other defendants under the "patient's
bill of rights" provision of the Texas Health and Safety Code for abuse,
neglect, and exploitation.1 52 The governmental defendants filed a plea to
the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, which the trial court
153
denied.
Lee argued that when the Legislature enacted the Health and Safety
Code's "patient's bill of rights" it expressly waived sovereign immunity
by providing that a patient harmed by a violation of the patient's bill of
rights while under the care of a mental health facility may sue the facility
for damages and other relief. 154 Although the terms "treatment facility"
and "mental health facility" are not expressly defined in this part of the
statute, the Health and Safety Code provides that "mental health facility"
has the meaning assigned by section 571.003 of the Code and "treatment
facility" has the meaning assigned by section 464.001 of the Code. 155 This
incorporation of definitions by implication provided a considerable boost
to Lee's argument, because these definitions include public facilities. The
court concluded, however, that mere incorporation of statutes that define
treatment facilities and mental health facilities to include public facilities
did not, without more, manifest a clear legislative
intent to waive immu156
nity, and sovereign immunity was not waived.
150. Id. § 321.003(a).
151. 38 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2001, pet. filed).
152. Lee also sued under the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997), alleging that her injuries were caused by a condition or
use of tangible personal property because employees of Wichita Falls State Hospital failed
to lock the interior door to her room and to provide locking devices on the door separating
the women's and the men's wings of the hospital. TDMHMR, 38 S.W.3d at 864. The court
of appeals concluded that that the true substance of Lee's complaint was that the sexual
assault was caused, not by the condition or use of the hospital doors, but by the failure of
the hospital staff to protect her from her assailant when they knew that she was hypersexual and promiscuous and that male patients had exploited her hypersexuality in the past.
This conduct did not fall within the Tort Claims Act's limited waiver of immunity for injuries caused by a condition or use of tangible property. Id. at 867-68.
153. Id. at 864.
154. Id. at 870.
155. Id.
156. TDMHMR, at 870-71.
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In the second of the three cases, Central Counties Center for Mental
Health & Mental Retardation Services v. Rodriguez,157 the Austin Court
of Appeals had two consolidated appeals that raised the same issue of
sovereign immunity. In one case, Karen Rodriguez had sued the Central
Counties Center for Mental Health & Mental Retardation Services
("Center") for personal injuries, including sexual exploitation by a
Center employee. 158 In the other case, Debbie Fiske and Raymond Rodriguez sued the Austin State Hospital ("Hospital") for damages they suffered and on behalf of their son, Christopher Roy Rodriguez, who
committed suicide while he was a patient there.' 5 9 The Center and the
Hospital brought these interlocutory appeals from two district courts' orders that denied their pleas to the jurisdiction.
As in TDMHMR, the issue on appeal was whether the legislature
clearly and unambiguously waived sovereign immunity when it enacted
section 321.003 of the Health and Safety Code. This time, however, the
court ruled that the legislature did waive sovereign immunity. The court
based its ruling primarily upon the definition of "mental health facility"
and what the court viewed as a "straightforward" construction of words
that have a "plain and ordinary meaning. '160 Both the Center and Hospital invited the court to consider contrary legislative history. 161 The
Code Construction Act plainly provides that "whether or not the statute
is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other
matters the ... legislative history;"' 162 the court of appeals declined the
invitation, "[b]ecause the legislature has spoken clearly, we will look no
163
further than the statute itself."
In the third action in this series, Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor,16 4 "Deborah Taylor filed a wrongful death and survival action against
Wichita Falls State Hospital and a doctor employed by the Hospital after
her husband committed suicide following his discharge from the Hospital."' 165 Taylor asserted that the hospital discharged her husband in a manner contrary to TDMHMR's "patient's bill of rights."'1 66 The hospital
asserted that it was immune from the suit, because chapter 321 of the
Health and Safety Code does not constitute a legislative waiver of immunity from suit. 167 The trial court denied the hospital's plea to the jurisdiction.' 68 The Waco Court of Appeals decided to follow the Austin court
and held that, for the reasons set forth in Rodriquez, section 321.003 con157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

45 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed).
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 712-13.
TEX. Gov'T CODE § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
Cent. Counties Ctr. for MH & MR Servs., 45 S.W.3d at 713.
48 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. granted).
Id. at 783.
Id.
Id. at 783-84.
Id. at 784.
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stitutes a clear and unambiguous legislative waiver of immunity from
169
suit.

V. HEALTH CARE FINANCE
A.

SUBROGATION

In Franks v. PrudentialHealth Care Plan, Inc.,170 Mr. Franks joined a
Prudential health maintenance organization ("HMO") through his employer, ATC Long Distance. The contractual document between Prudential and Mr. Franks' employer provided that Prudential was entitled to be
reimbursed "the reasonable cash value" of the medical services it provided to Mr. Franks for injuries caused by third-parties. 17 1
In 1996, Mr. Franks was in a traffic accident and settled with the other
driver's insurance company for his personal injury claims. Subsequently,
Prudential requested, through its collection agent, that Mr. Franks reimburse them $2,074.98-the value of the medical services Prudential had
already provided to him172-out of his settlement proceeds. 173 Mr.
Franks complied with Prudential's request but later filed suit claiming
that Prudential had no right to reimbursement, since they would receive a
windfall by collecting twice, once from the member who prepaid Prudential and again from the member's tort settlement. In response, Prudential
claimed that it was actually Franks who would obtain a double recovery,
once from Prudential for medical care and again from the tortfeasor with
whom he settled.
In 1999, Mr. Franks filed a class action suit in federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment that Prudential lacked enforceable rights of reimbursement and that Prudential recovered more in reimbursement for his
medical treatment than they had to pay for that treatment. 174 The defendants renewed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) claiming that plan
documents conferred upon Prudential the "unequivocal right" to recover
the reasonable value of medical treatment from the settlement proceeds
of enrollees injured by a third-party. 175 Prudential contended that the
terms of Mr. Franks plan documents should be enforced as written, and
he could not demonstrate a reason for those documents to be invalidated.
Mr. Franks argued that the defendants have no right to pursue and obtain
reimbursements from plan members. Alternatively, Mr. Franks con169. Cent. Counties Ctr. For MH & MR Servs., 45 S.W.3d at 785. The hospital also
argued that section 321.002 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to
MHMR, an executive agency. The court, however, stated that the constitutionality of section 321.002 had "no bearing on the trial court's jurisdiction to entertain Taylor's suit.
Thus, it [was] not the proper subject of a plea to the jurisdiction." Id.
170. 164 F. Supp. 2d 865 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
171. Id. at 869.
172. The amount was apparently based upon the typical charges for such medical services, not the actual amount paid by Prudential. Id. at 870.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 869-70.
175. Franks, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71.
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entitended, if Prudential can seek reimbursement, "Prudential is at most
176
tled only to the amount it actually paid on Mr. Frank's behalf."
The Fifth Circuit has determined that where an ERISA plan's language
sets out plain and unambiguous terms for subrogation and reimbursement, those terms must be enforced as written. 177 Applying this circuit
precedent, the district court concluded that "the terms which appear in
Mr. Franks' plan, including the provision allowing Prudential to recover
receives
the reasonable value of medical services in the event a member
178
funds from a third-party tortfeasor," should be enforced.
Since the Fifth Circuit had not addressed the issue of whether the language of "reasonable cash value" is enforceable in a subrogation provision, the court considered other federal and state appellate courts that
in
have enforced contractual rights of subrogation and reimbursement 179
First
the
from
decisions
followed
court
The
documents.
HMO plan
and Eighth18 0 Circuits that comported with Fifth Circuit precedent, supporting the argument that reimbursement rights, including "reasonable
value" subrogation provisions, under the terms of an ERISA plan, are
valid and enforceable. The district court also rejected Mr. Franks' argument that the federal Health Maintenance Organization Act prevents an
HMO from seeking subrogation and reimbursement. The court looked at
the legislative history of the HMO Act and8 concluded that Congress did
not intend to limit third-party recoveries.' '
The district also dismissed Mr. Franks' claim that an HMO should be
limited to the prepayments it receives from its members for providing
health care.' 8 2 The court ruled that Prudential is not getting a windfall,
since the money it receives from reimbursement could go to the reasonable cost of doing business or to keep membership fees down.' 83 The
court therefore appeared to accept Prudential's argument that, in an accounting sense, Mr. Franks has probably already received a financial benefit from the operation of this reimbursement provision, and a judgment
in his favor would simply have amounted to reaping a benefit while refusing to contribute to its cost.

176. Id. at 870.
177. Sunbeam-Oster Co. Group Benefits Plan v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1374 (5th
Cir. 1996).
178. Franks, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 880-81.
179. See Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 278-79 (1st Cir.
2000) (enforcing strict language of an HMO reimbursement clause).
180. Ince v. Aetna Health Mgmt., Inc., 173 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 1999) (enforcing an
HMO's "reasonable value" language in subrogation provision).
181. Franks, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
182. Id. at 888.
183. Id. at 887-88.
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184

On July 10, 2001, Texas Attorney General John Cornyn offered a legal
opinion in response to a question posed by the Harris County Hospital
District. 185 Specifically, the Harris County Hospital District asked
whether it could provide free or discounted non-emergency health care to
persons residing within its boundaries, without regard to their immigration or legal status. In brief, the Attorney General responded that the
hospital district was barred from using public funding for such purposes
by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 ("PRWORA"). 186 Furthermore, Cornyn noted that while
PRWORA itself imposes no sanction specified for violations, the hospital
district could face consequences under state and federal laws for using
public funds for purposes specifically barred by PRWORA." The Attorney General's opinion has implications for all hospital districts, hospital
authorities, county hospitals, other public hospitals, and non-public
hospitals.
Under the Texas Health and Safety Code, the Harris County Hospital
District ("Harris County") is required to provide medical care to indigent
and needy persons residing in the district. 187 The state code further defines the responsibilities of hospital districts through the Indigent Health
Care and Treatment Act, which states that when a patient residing in the
county cannot pay for the hospital care, the district must provide the necessary care to the patient without charge. 188 A patient's status as an alien
does not preclude the patient from being considered a state or county
resident for purposes of public benefit programs; however, the hospital
district must comply with the federal immigration law and policy when it
comes to provision of services. 189
While the federal government has broad constitutional powers regarding the admission, naturalization, and residence of aliens, states have no
such power. State laws that are inconsistent with federal immigration
policy are preempted by federal law." Therefore, Harris County's provision of services cannot be inconsistent with federal immigration policy.
The PRWORA is a federal act that deems undocumented or illegal
aliens to be ineligible for state and local public assistance. 190 This eligibility requirement has a number of exceptions. First, the hospital district
must provide necessary treatment for the emergency medical conditions
184. Much of the analysis in this section was prepared by Lewis Lefko, Esq. of Haynes
and Boone.
185. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0394 (2001).
186. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1646 (West 1999).
187. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 281.002 (Vernon 2001).

188. See generally § 61.001.
189. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. JM-962 (1988) at 3, 8 & WW-1274 (1962) at 3.
190. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1621(a) (West 1999). Under PRWORA, aliens ineligible for such
public assistance include those who are not qualified aliens (as defined in id. § 1641), nonimmigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act (id. § 1101 et seq.), or aliens pa-

roled into the United States under id. § 1182(d)(5) for less than one year.
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of aliens, regardless of immigration or legal status. 19 1 This requirement
for providing emergency care is found not only in PRWORA but is required by the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act ("EMTALA").t 92 The hospital district may also provide public
health assistance for immunizations with respect to immunizable diseases
and for testing and treatment of symptoms of communicable diseases
193
whether or not such symptoms are caused by a communicable disease.
Finally, PRWORA allows for the provision of public benefits to undocumented aliens through the enactment of a state law after August 22, 1996,
which "affirmatively provides for such eligibility."'1 94 By "affirmatively
provides," this section requires that the state law expressly state the legislature's intent that undocumented aliens are to be eligible for certain
95
public benefits.'
Texas enacted a law in 1997 that allows for greater eligibility of undocumented aliens for certain public assistance. The law, which amends
the Texas Family Code, 1 96 states that the Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services may use state and federal funds to provide child protective services and related benefits to eligible children and families
"without regard to the immigration status of the child or the child's family."'1 97 In the same law, the Texas Legislature amended another section
of the Family Code, providing that the commissioners court of a county
may provide for services to and support of children in need of protection
and care "without regard to the immigration status of the child or the
198
child's family.'
While both provisions expand the eligibility of undocumented aliens
for public assistance, Cornyn concluded that the Texas Legislature clearly
stated its intent to limit the expansion to publicly-funded child protective
services. No Texas law has been enacted that would allow Harris County
Hospital District, or any other public hospital or hospital district, to provide public funds for nonemergency health care for undocumented aliens.
One argument made against the Attorney General's conclusion is that
House Bill 1398 of the Seventy-sixth Texas Legislature, which amended a
provision of the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act, allows undocumented aliens to receive public benefits from Harris County. 99 However, Cornyn responded that the amended law does not expressly refer to
the immigration status of aliens. 200 Cornyn further stated that there is no
8 U.S.C.A. § 1621(b) (West 1999).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 2001).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1621(b) (West 1999).
Id. § 1621.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0394 (2001) at 4.
196. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.004(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
197. Id. § 264.004(c); see also Act of May 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 575, § 23, 1997
Tex. Gen. Laws 2012, 2020.
198. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.006 (Vernon Supp. 2002); see also Act of May 19,
1997, 75th Leg., R.S. ch. 575 § 25, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2012, 2020.
199. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0394 (2001) at 4 n.3.
200. Id. at 5.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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indication that the Legislature intended to provide state or local public
benefits for which undocumented aliens are ineligible under
PRWORA.2 0 1 Since the amended law does not "affirmatively provide"
such expanded public benefits for undocumented aliens, Harris County20is2
not allowed to provide such public assistance to undocumented aliens.
The opinion also considers the argument that PRWORA violates the
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.20 3 The Supreme
Court has held that Congress cannot force federal regulatory programs
directly on states. 20 4 It is argued that such action infringes upon state
sovereignty-which is generally the ability of the states to establish their
own legislative decision-making process-because PRWORA requires a
state that wishes to allow the benefits for undocumented aliens to pass a
law rather than use any other means the state might choose. 20 5 Cornyn
responded that PRWORA does not force the state to take action but
rather prohibits the state from allowing undocumented aliens to receive
most public benefits.2 0 6 In other words, PRWORA does not coerce the
states to legislate in a particular area, but if a state wishes to depart from
federal restrictions, Congress offers the state the ability to do so by enacting a statute in compliance with PRWORA. While Congress may be seen
as influencing the states' actions through PRWORA, the Tenth Amendment does not bar Congress from encouraging a state to regulate in a
particular way. The United States Supreme Court has historically allowed Congress to urge a state to adopt legislation which follows a federal interest, allowing Congress to provide incentives as a method of
influence or to use a number of similar methods, "short of outright
207
coercion."
While PRWORA itself has no specific enforcement procedures for violations, the Attorney General's opinion notes that Harris County Hospital District may face consequences under state or federal law for spending
public funds for a purpose specifically barred by PRWORA. The consequences under state or federal law could significantly affect the amount
of funding Harris County is granted for the future.
Under Texas law, a violation of PRWORA could lead to an audit of
Harris County's financial records. The district is subject to accounting
and control procedures under authority delegated by the commissioners
court.20 8 In approving the budget, the commissioners court may take into
account the unauthorized expenditures made by the hospital district
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot directly compel a state to act or enforce a federal regulatory program); see also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (stating that Congress cannot circumvent this prohibition by directly conscripting state officers).
205. Id. at 5.
206. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0394 (2001) at 5.
207. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 166.
208. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 281.049 (Vernon 2001).
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board. Additionally, the hospital district board could be subject to a tax20 9
payer's suit to enjoin future unauthorized expenditures.
Harris County may also face consequences related to other state or
federal funding. As a condition of receiving funding from Medicare and
Medicaid, Harris County must comply with applicable federal laws related to the health and safety of patients. 210 The Attorney General further noted that some state-funded grants allocated to Harris County may
21 1 If
require the district to comply with applicable state and federal laws.
PRWORA is considered to be an "applicable federal law" for the purposes of such grants, then violations of PRWORA may compromise Harris County's receipt of certain state or federal funding. Such
consequences related to state or federal funding may affect non-public
hospitals as well if they have received state-funded grants and treat immigrant patients with such funds.
Many hospital districts are concerned that the Attorney General's
opinion will greatly affect treatment policies, fearing the impact that denial of treatment to thousands of undocumented immigrants will have on
the people and the health system. Several hospital districts have noted
that the denial of preventive care to undocumented aliens may eventually
lead to more expensive emergency care, 212 which is required to be provided by EMTALA. The danger, therefore, would not only lie in the
health and welfare of the immigrants, but also on the effectiveness of the
health system itself.
While many Texas hospital districts and other hospitals are concerned
about the impact of this opinion, some have noted that the opinion might
not have a practical impact. Many hospitals have a policy under which
patients are not even asked about their immigration or legal status. Patients are asked only if they reside in the county. Such a "don't ask, don't
tell" policy, common among many Texas hospitals, could make the restrictions imposed by PRWORA nearly impossible to enforce. Also, as
with all Texas Attorney General opinions, the opinion does not have the
force of law. Until a lawsuit is brought and a court enters a judgment
reflecting the Attorney General's opinion, no legal precedent exists to
support the Attorney General's opinion.
VI.

FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS: FALSE CLAIMS ACT

In Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital ("Riley HI"1),213 the en banc
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed its previous ruling2 14 and held
209. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-79 (1983) at 3 (acknowledging the authority of
commissioners court to reject hospital district's budget).
210. 42 C.F.R § 482.11 (2001).

211. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0394 (2001) at 6, 7.
212. See Ed Housewright, Immigrants could lose preventive care: AG's opinion may affect Parkland,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 16, 2001, at 6A.
213. 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001).
214. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Riley ").
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that the provisions of the False Claims Act ("FCA")2 15 that allow a qui
tam relator to pursue a claim when the government has chosen not to
intervene do not violate the separation of powers. In so doing, the Fifth
Circuit has finally fallen in step with other federal courts that have decided that same issue.
In United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital,216 a nurse
brought suit against her former employer under the qui tam provisions of
the FCA and chose to pursue the suit although the government exercised
its right not to intervene. The district court dismissed the lawsuit on
standing grounds. Although the Fifth Circuit in Riley I held that Riley
did have standing, the court further held that "solo" qui tam actions pursued under the FCA violate the separation of powers. The Fifth Circuit
decided to rehear the case en banc but delayed the rehearing until after a
ruling by the Supreme Court on the standing of qui tam relators in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.2 17 In
May of 2000, the 7-2 majority in Stevens held that the federal government's injury in fact conferred standing on a qui tam relator bringing suit
under the False Claims Act even when the government chooses not to
intervene in the suit.21 8 However, the majority explicitly declined to decide whether such suits were in violation of the "appointments" clause or
the "take care" clause of Article II, sections 2 and 3 of the
219
Constitution.
The standing issue thus resolved, in Riley II the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, turned to the question of separation of powers-specifically the
"take care" clause and the "appointments" clause-in qui tam suits
brought under the FCA where the government chooses not to intervene.
The court first looked at the role of history in qui tam law suits, essentially agreeing with the dissent in Stevens that the important historical
role played by qui tam jurisprudence was one argument supporting the
view that qui tam suits brought under the FCA do not violate Article
11.220 Secondly, the court determined that the Executive Branch "retains
sufficient control" over such law suits to carry out its constitutional duty
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.2 21 Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Riley I panel had relied heavily on four factors listed
215. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3731 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
216. 982 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
217. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
218. Id. at 774.
219. Id. at 778 n.8. The dissent, however, ventured that the historical evidence used by
the majority to determine the standing issue was also dispositive in resolving the Article II
questions. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Riley 1I, 252 F.3d at 753; see supra note 218 and accompanying text.
221. Id. at 753-54; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The court cites the following examples: the
government retains the right to veto settlements by a qui tam relator, may take over the
case within 60 days of notification (and after 60 days, upon a showing of good cause), may
dismiss the FCA action over the objections of the qui tam relator, may request copies of
the pleadings and deposition transcripts, and, perhaps most importantly, receives the larger
percentage of any recovery, up to 70%. Riley H, 252 F.3d at 753-54; see also 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3730 (West 2002).
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by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson222 that demonstrated suffi22 3
cient executive control over the Ethics in Government Act ("EGA").
The court in Riley II explained that Morrison is inapplicable in determining the constitutionality of the FCA, because: (1) under the EGA, the
independent counsel acts as the United States itself, while under the
FCA, the qui tam relator merely brings a lawsuit in the name of the
United States; and (2) the EGA deals with criminal prosecution while the
FCA deals with civil litigation. 224 The court went on to say that were
Morrison applicable, there is a "credible argument" that since the Supreme Court upheld the independent counsel provisions in Morrison, it
would similarly uphold the qui tam provisions of the FCA.2 25 The court
stated further that any infringements on executive power by the qui tam
provisions of the FCA are relatively small seen in the greater context of
the American judicial system as a whole. 22 6 Finally, the court quickly
dismissed the contention that the qui tam provisions of the FCA violate
the "appointments" clause, since "qui tam relators are not United States
227
officers."
The dissent in Riley II for the most part reiterated what the Riley I
panel held. First, the dissent attacked the conclusions of the majority regarding the amount of control retained by the executive in qui tam lawsuits brought under the FCA, using the four factors in Morrison as a
222. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). In Morrison, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act.
223. These factors are: (1) the Attorney General retains the power to remove the independent counsel for "good cause"; (2) the Attorney General's decision not to request appointment of an independent counsel is committed to his unreviewable discretion, giving
the Executive a degree of control over the power to initiate an investigation by the independent counsel; (3) the Attorney General defines the jurisdiction of the independent
counsel; and (4) once appointed, the independent counsel must abide by Justice Department policy. Riley 1, 196 F.3d at 527-28 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696).
224. Riley I1, 252 F.3d at 755.
225. Id. at 756. All other circuits that have decided this issue have come to the same
conclusion about Morrison, albeit through slightly different reasoning. The Ninth Circuit
has given the most complete comparison of the FCA and Morrison, concluding that the
four Morrison factors were not intended as a determinative test, and instead that the infringements on Executive power found in Morrison should be compared "in toto" with the
infringements on Executive power under the qui tam provisions of the FCA. United States
ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 1993). Finding that the qui tam provisions infringed less on the Executive power than the independent counsel provisions, the
Kelly court held that the FCA qui tam provisions did not violate the "take care" clause. Id.
Other courts confronted with the same issue have explicitly or impliedly followed the reasoning in Kelly. See United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41
F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. Supp.
2d 1160, 1167-68 (D.N.M. 2000); United States ex rel. Wright v. Cleo Wallace Ctrs., 132 F.
Supp. 2d 913, 919 (D. Colo. 2000); see also United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v.
United Tech. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155 (2nd. Cir. 1993) (holding that the qui tam provisions of the FCA do not violate the "take care" clause, but without referring to Kelly or
Morrison).
226. Riley II, 252 F.3d at 757.
227. Id. at 757-58; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; accord Taxpayers Against Fraud,41 F.3d at
1041; Kelly, 9 F.3d at 758; United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp., 824 F. Supp.
830, 836 (N.D. I11.1993).
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determinative test instead of as an analogy. 228 Finding none of the factors in Morrison present in the qui tam provisions of the FCA, the dissent
determined that the FCA violates the "take care" clause. Second, the
dissent raised a paradox regarding the qui tam relator's status in reference to the "appointments" clause, 229 since the Supreme Court has twice
held that "persons litigating on behalf of the United States are officers of
the United States," 230 qui tam relators must be "officers who have not
properly been appointed or... non-officers who therefore are not qualified to sue on behalf of the government," either of which, concluded the
dissent, violates the "appointments" clause. 23 1 The dissent then pointed
out that the Article II question was explicitly left open in Stevens and
stated that at least two (and possibly three) members of the Supreme
Court have expressed reservations regarding qui tam actions under Article 11.232 Finally, the dissent asserted that history is not necessarily conclusive on the Article II issues as it is on the Article III issue, because (1)
special deference must be given to history in an Article III standing in234
quiry,233 and (2) the history of qui tam law suits is ambiguous.
Although the dissent in Riley II raised some compelling concerns,
every court (with the sole exception of the Riley I panel) faced with the
same issue has agreed with the Riley II majority. Were the question to
reach the Supreme Court, it is clear that Justices Stevens and Souter
agree with the Riley H court that the qui tam provisions of the FCA do
not violate Article 11.235 However, as the dissent in Riley II pointed out,
Justices Scalia and Thomas (and possibly Justice Kennedy) appear to
have reservations regarding Article II and the FCA. 236 In other words,
the fate of qui tam lawsuits brought under the FCA, especially those in
which the government chooses not to intervene, is not altogether certain.
Absent a split among the circuits, however, it is anyone's guess whether
four justices believe the issue is sufficiently important to warrant certiorari review.
VII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
As is usually the case, the 2001 Legislative session produced literally
hundreds of new health care related laws-far more than can be usefully
reviewed and analyzed in the space allocated for any Survey article. By
way of compromise, I am appending a list of the most significant bills that
were enacted by the 77th Legislature together with a brief synopsis of the
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Riley II, 252 F.3d at 760-67 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. 252 F.3d at 767-69.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671 n.12; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
Riley 11, 252 F.3d at 768-69 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 770; see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167

(2000).
233. Riley II, 252 F.3d at 771-72 (citing Stevens, 529 U.S. at 766 (2000)).

234. Id. at 772-74.
235. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 801 (Stevens, J.,dissenting.)
236. See supra text accompanying note 213.
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major features likely to be of interest.2 37

A.

HEALTH BENEFITS COVERAGE/INSURANCE REGULATION:

1. H.B. 2127 - Amends Insurance Code, adding Article 21.52L, providing that the issuer of a health benefit plan may not refuse to enroll a
person in the plan solely because the person is enrolled in another health
benefit plan at the time the person applies for the coverage; applies to
plans offered by insurers, HMOs, 5.01(a)'s, and MEWAs, among others;
violation constitutes unfair discrimination under Article 21.21-8, which
provides for an award of compensatory damages, court costs and attorneys fees plus, for knowing violations, a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per
claimant, and injunctive relief.
2. S.B. 8 - Omnibus Women's Equal Health Care Act amends the Insurance Code prohibiting discrimination in health care rates and reimbursement for women's services; providing administrative and civil
penalties.
3. S.B. 544 - Amends Insurance Code Article 20A to add to "basic
health care services" periodic health assessments for adult enrollees, including annual well-woman examinations; requires the Insurance Commissioner to require an HMO to verify that a physician's license to
practice medicine and any other certificate the physician is required to
hold, including a certificate issued by the Department of Public Safety or
the DEA or a certificate issued under the Medicare program, is valid as
of the date of initial credentialing and on the date of each recredentailing;
prohibits the Commissioner from requiring recredentialing more that
once every three years; authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate a
standardized form to be used by a public or private hospital, HMO, or
PPO for verification of physician credentials.
B.

INDIGENT/CHARITY CARE

1. H.B. 2419 - Amends the Health and Safety Code to permit a nonprofit hospital or hospital system that contracts with a local county to
provide indigent health care services under the Indigent Health Care and
Treatment Act to credit unreimbursed costs from direct care provided to
an eligible county resident toward meeting the hospital's or system's
charity care and government-sponsored indigent health care requirement;
requires each hospital to publish annually a notice of the hospital's charity care program and policies in a local newspaper; and requires the TDH
to publish annually a manual that lists each nonprofit hospital in this state
with a brief summary of the hospital's charity care policies.
2. H.B. 2602 - Amends the Health and Safety and Government Codes
to make clarifying changes to the Indigent Health Care and Treatment
Act enacted in 1999; provides that if a county and health care provider or
237. The full text of all bills can be found at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/billubr.
htm; disposition tables are at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/isaf/.
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a public hospital and health care provider disagree on a patient's eligibility, they are authorized to submit the matter to the Texas Department of
Health; authorizes rather than requires TDH to adopt rules governing the
distribution of state assistance that establish a maximum annual allocation for each county eligible for assistance; specifies the allocation of the
amount in the tertiary care account that is not held in reserve for reimbursement of unpaid tertiary medical services; provides that minimum eligibility standards for indigent health care must incorporate a net income
eligibility level equal to 21 rather than 25 percent of the federal poverty
level.
C.

LONG-TERM CARE AND ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES

1. H.B. 482 - Amends the Health and Safety Code protecting persons
who report abuse or neglect from retaliation by nursing homes or intermediate care facilities.
2. S.B. 355 - Amends the Health and Safety Code relating to a nursing home resident's right to informed consent regarding the prescription
of psychoactive medications.
3. S.B. 1839 - Amends the Health and Safety Code to address quality
of care issues in long-term care facilities.
D.

MANAGED CARE

1. H.B. 606 - Amends Article 3.70-3C, Insurance Code, by adding
Section 3B prohibiting certain health benefit plans from requiring the use
of hospitalists by participating physicians.
2. H.B. 2382 - Amends the Insurance Code to prohibit exclusion of
contraceptive drugs, devices and related services by a health plan.
3. H.B. 2828 - Amends Insurance Code Article 20A.11 to require
HMO's that delegate functions to any entity to execute a written agreement with each such entity and file a copy with the Department of Insurance; specifies that delegation agreements shall give the HMO authority
to monitor solvency requirements (if any) applicable to the delegated entities and shall obligate the delegated entities to permit the Insurance
Commissioner to examine records relevant to solvency requirements and
the ability of the delegated entity to fulfill its contractual obligations;
adds reserve requirement for delegated networks; requires contracts between a limited provider network or delegated entity and physicians to
provide for notice to enrollees before their physician is terminated from
the network or entity, for continuity of care for certain enrollees even
after the physician is terminated; requires networks to allow referrals to
out-of-network providers for covered services that are not available from
network physicians and providers and to pay for such services at the usual
and customary or agreed-upon rate.
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MEDICAL/PATIENT RECORDS

1. H.B. 398 - Amends the Occupations Code to include billing records
in medical record provisions related to physician-patient communication;
requires TSBME to promulgate a rule regarding appointment of temporary or permanent guardian of physician's billing or medical records.
2. S.B. 11 - Subject to a number of exceptions, requires covered entities to comply with HIPAA Privacy Standard; permits disclosure of protected health information to health researchers only upon the express
written consent of the patient or upon documentation that a waiver has
been approved by either an IRB or a privacy board; prescribes the membership and activities of privacy boards; prohibits reidentification of individual from protected health information or use of protected health
information for marketing purposes without individual's consent; provides enforcement provisions for injunctive relief, civil penalties, disciplinary action, and exclusion from state-funded health programs.
F.

MENTAL HEALTH

1. H.B. 1072 - Authorizes a peace officer or health officer to take into
custody, detain, and return to a treatment facility a patient or client under
a court order for treatment at the facility.
2. H.B. 1887 - Amends the Health and Safety code regarding the
competency of patients receiving mental health services to consent to
research.
3. S.B. 22 - "JoJo's Law" amends the Health and Safety Code regarding the admission of minors to facilities and the right of minors to consent
to treatment and rehabilitation for chemical dependency.
4. S.B. 684 - Amends the Health and Safety Code expanding the definition of nonphysician mental health professional for purposes of a proceeding or evaluation under the Mental Health Code.
5. S.B. 1588 - Amends Health and Safety Code relating to a preliminary examination for emergency detention because of mental illness.
6. S.B. 1767 - Amends Section 574.021(e) of the Health and Safety
Code relating to the issuance of a protective custody order by a
magistrate.
G. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
1. S.B. 731 - Amends the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act to exempt a nonprofit corporation officer from liability concerning any action
taken or omission made, unless the officer's conduct was not made in
good faith or in the best interest of the corporation.
H.

PHARMACY/DRUGS

1. S.B. 65 - Authorizes a Class A or Class C pharmacy located in
Texas to provide pharmacy services, including the dispensing of drugs,
through a telepharmacy system in a facility that is not at the same loca-
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tion as the Class A or Class C pharmacy; provides that a telepharmacy
system is required to be under the continuous supervision of a pharmacist
as determined by rule of the Texas State Board of Pharmacy; provides
that the pharmacist is not required to be physically present at the site of
the telepharmacy system to qualify as continuous supervision; requires
the pharmacist to supervise the system electronically by audio and video
communication; authorizes a telepharmacy system to be located only at a
health care facility in Texas that is regulated by this state or the United
States; requires the board to adopt rules regarding the use of a
telepharmacy system under this section, including certain rules; prohibits
a telepharmacy system from being located in a community in which a
Class A or Class C pharmacy is located; authorizes the telepharmacy system to continue to operate in the community if a Class A or Class C
pharmacy is established in a community in which a telepharmacy system
has been located under this section.
2. S.B. 768 - Amends Section 562.008(a) of the Occupations Code to
require the pharmacist, if a practitioner certifies on the prescription form
that a specific prescribed brand is medically necessary, to dispense the
drug as written by the practitioner; allows the State Board of Pharmacy to
comply, by rule, with certain federal labeling requirements; allows pharmacy students to work as interns outside of their college-assigned programs; allows academic pharmacists to serve on the board; increases
continuing education requirements for pharmacists from 24 hours to 30
hours during the preceding 24 months; limits the use of the word
"apothecary".

I.

PHYSICIANS/HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS

1. H.B. 1183 - Amends Section 1 Subtitle C, Title 3 of the Occupations Code relating to the regulation of surgical assistants; granting
rulemaking authority; providing an administrative penalty.
2. H.B. 3152 - Amends the Health and Safety Code to authorize a
physician, podiatrist, or dentist (medical professional) to require a hospital to participate in alternative dispute resolution procedures or binding
arbitration if the hospital's credentials committee has failed to take action
on a completed application as required or a medical professional is subject to a professional review action that may adversely affect his medical
staff membership or privileges and the medical professional believes that
mediation of the dispute is desirable.
3. H.B. 3421 - Amends Section 204.155(b), Occupations Code relating
to the licensure of physician assistants.
4. H.B. 3600 - Amends the Occupations Code relating to the confidentiality of records regarding the compliance monitoring of physicians
by the TSBME.
5. S.B. 1024 - Amends the Occupations Code concerning immunity in
connection with investigations under and enforcement of the law regulating the practice of podiatry.
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6. S.B. 1166 - Amends Subsection (e), Section 157.053 of the Occupations Code relating to the authority of certain advanced practice nurses
and physician assistants to prescribe drugs.
7. S.B. 1264 - Amends the Occupation Code relating to the scope of
practice of a physician assistant acting in a delegated practice.
J.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. H.B. 3335 - Amends Section 48.051(c), Human Resources Code,
relating to duties and immunities of certain persons reporting that an elderly or disabled person is in a state of abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
K.

TELEMEDICINE, TELEPHARMACY AND TELEDENTISTRY

1. H.B. 2700 - Amends Government Code by adding Sections
531.02171 and 531.02172 relating to certain services provided through
telemedicine; requires pilot program for services near the Texas-Mexico
border.
2. S.B. 65 - Authorizes a Class A or Class C pharmacy located in
Texas to provide pharmacy services, including the dispensing of drugs,
through a telepharmacy system in a facility that is not at the same location as the Class A or Class C pharmacy; provides that a telepharmacy
system is required to be under the continuous supervision of a pharmacist
as determined by rule of the Texas State Board of Pharmacy; provides
that the pharmacist is not required to be physically present at the site of
the telepharmacy system to qualify as continuous supervision; requires
the pharmacist to supervise the system electronically by audio and video
communication; authorizes a telepharmacy system to be located only at a
health care facility in Texas that is regulated by this state or the United
States; requires the board to adopt rules regarding the use of a
telepharmacy system under this section, including certain rules; prohibits
a telepharmacy system from being located in a community in which a
Class A or Class C pharmacy is located; authorizes the telepharmacy system to continue to operate in the community if a Class A or Class C
pharmacy is established in a community in which a telepharmacy system
has been located under this section.
3. S.B. 789 - Amends the Government Code, the Health and Safety
Code, the Insurance Code, the Utilities Code, and the Human Resources
Code relating to the regulation and reimbursement of telemedicine medical services and teledentistry under the Medicaid program.
L. MISCELLANEOUS
1. H.B. 100 - Amends the Occupations Code relating to the regulation of certain health care activities using the Internet.
2. H.B. 1922 - Creates an individual's right to be informed regarding
personal data collected by a state government body.
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3. H.B. 2408 - Authorizes the Health Professions Council to conduct a
study relating to the complaint procedures of certain health care regulatory entities.
4. H.B. 2600 - Amends the Labor Code relating to the provision of
workers' compensation benefits and to the operation of the workers'
compensation insurance system; providing penalties.
5. S.B. 583 - Authorizes hospital lien to include reasonable and necessary charges for emergency hospital care provided by physicians during
first seven days of hospitalization minus charges for which the physician
has received or is entitled to receive insurance benefits.
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